Tuesday, September 19, 2006

A Sinner’s Confession

There has been a lot of banter about my righteousness by people who know nothing about me. I can say honestly you’re all poor judges of evidence and righteousness. I will be forthright and admit I know myself to be an accomplished sinner. I have no chance to satisfy the inherent standard built into my conscience or the truest standard of God. What I can say is that He who supplies my deficiencies is not a recent topic of responsibility escapism but a living being endowed with power. Power to remove from me the performance of your accusations. I could be motivated by money, pride, fame, power and others but have the benefit of a conquering power that overcomes these. Those of you who know the name of this Lord or traditions men have said please Him know form but no substance of His being or power. Sure you see me as a hopeless misanthropic like yourselves because you have not tasted of conquering power. Power that will make you fearless even of the Fed Machines; a kind gentle power that can restrain its strength with love or in love destroy any present danger. There can be no reasoning with those who are devoid of even the idea in their vocabulary and concepts. You will never understand having a hope in His promise even when circumstance appears to be the death of you. Dorean was not the brainchild of this sinner but of a man subjected to one greater and in all ways superior. Too superior not to restrain rebellion in my heart. Just because of inconvenience or pain one cannot throw off this relationship. In all ways Trusting this Lord seems risky but factually it is safety in this life and our eternal life. Dorean is a fertile field for this crop of trust whether client or principal because things are really never as they appear. If you have the certainty of God’s blessing before you began this journey why do you doubt now? God has no doubt what He speaks becomes, He “Amens” His own words and we discover our likeness to Him when we “Amen” His word. What opportunity He’s given us all. Amen!


son of a prophet said...

jim mccanney said...


September 19, 2006 emergency posting #2 15:46 EDT ... after reviewing the NASA postings about this alleged object following the shuttle since early this AM i am starting to wonder if we are seeing the beginning of a disinformation campaign ... my reason ... in the past something like a UFO following the shuttle would not have been released like this and especially not until NASA found out what it really was ... couple this with the fact known amongst many of us who have seen the full new world order agenda that they have had four stages to world control starting with the russian-USA cold war ... the next and final ultimate fear tactic being a bogus alien threat that would have millions world wide clamoring for "safety" ... and just like the recent recall of spinach which i have wondered about also as being another "control" by the gov psychos ... could this be just NASA sloppy reporting ...OR ... is this the start of phase 4 of the world wide control scenario ... the new world order bunch folks are losing ground fast with the public and we have all been expecting another "event" ... understanding who controls NASA leads me to believe that somewhere in this reporting is a smelly batch of fish ... regarding the orbit of this object which now has been trailing the shuttle for over 12 hours between earth and the shuttle ... NASA used the word "hovering" in its news release when describing the movement of this object ... is this a form of bait for the news media ??? ... what a strange word to use ... for an orbit to match that of the shuttle to begin with speaks of a very specific and unusual orbit ... to keep in line with the shuttle and also keep from moving far ahead of the shuttle over a 12 hour period also spanks of a form of orbital control as noted in posting #1 above ... one might see that in the end this is just a big piece of space junk but as the hours tic away and this object remains in line with the shuttle orbit after orbit (now many orbits and counting) ... hmmm ... i will keep posting as new analysis comes in ... jim mccanney

dgwondering said...

The person posting as Kurt said: "Dorean was not the brainchild of this sinner but of a man subjected to one greater and in all ways superior."

So Dorean was the brainchild of Christ?

Yea. Sure.

whatdoyoumean said...

Seen it,

Can you tell me what a settlement conference is?

midwesttoo said...

Securitization is Illegal


Under US laws, securitization is illegal, primarily because its fraudulent and causes specific violations of RICO, usury, antitrust and constitutional laws. Securitization of many types of assets (loans, credit cards, auto receivables, intellectual property, etc.) has become more prevalent, particularly for financially distressed companies and companies with low or mid-tier credit ratings. This article focuses on securitization as it pertains to asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed securities, and analyzes critical legal and corporate governance issues.

things that make you go UHMMM

provb1022 said...

Amen again and again

whyudothat said...

lol SOP!

no offense but there are thousands of pieces of space junk in orbit all of the time, and as many new ones pop up NASA tracks for the next time the shuttle is in orbit.

the reason why it is close to the shuttle now is the crew witnessed the piece of material jettison from the shuttles cargo area after test firing the re-entry rockets (on video).

so as much as i believe in more life forms. i dont think a piece of material from the shuttle is ET!

tcob247 said...

everything is a conspiracy with SOP

I think that the aliens in the UFO were eating spinach

son of a prophet said...

"...no offense but there are thousands of pieces of space junk in orbit all of the time..."

true. but as mccanney points out, space junk cannot maintain a similar orbit to the shuttle unless it has its own power source.

This post has been removed by the author said...
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
Peanut Gallery said...

SOP said,
true. but as mccanney points out, space junk cannot maintain a similar orbit to the shuttle unless it has its own power source.

This shows how ignorant Mcdumbass is. While the shuttle is "docked" to the ISS it is not under power, nor is the ISS. The ISS maintains orbit on it's own without power(simple physics)The only adjustments are made periodically to maintain altitude, not forward momentum.LOLLOLOLOLOLOL

whyudothat said...

PG is right about the physics.

If a spacewalker was holding a wrench in his hand and simply opened his hand and let it go (without accelerating it) 20 hours later it would still be right next to the space shuttle traveling the same speed, they are in the same orbit, both falling to earth at the same rate and same direction. until either one hits something in its path, they will continue to be next to each other until one of them accelerates from its current configuration.

KYHOOYA said...

Kinda like what that gave that guy the idea when the two apples hit his head at the same time.

Nothing newton about that!

I just could'nt sop myself on that one. Oh well, so sue me.

SOP don't take everything you hear as the truth, sit back and let it sink in bit.

Anyone out there with a brain has taken a look at how things are going down here and said" Honey I think we better take the long way around , this just dos'nt look good". "Their they go again fucking up a perfectly good plant and to think we almost bought that Time-share"

I know I would.

mogel said...


Sources for additional authority:

C.J.S., "Officers", sections 190-199;
C.J.S., "Public Admin. Law", sections 49-58;
Am Jur2d, "Public Officers", sections 298-311;
Am Jur2d, "Admin. Law", sections 69-74 and 221-226
Related: 65 ALR 811, and 107 ALR 1483 (delegations re taxes).

Pierce v. United States (The "Floyd Acceptances"), 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 666 (1869): Bills of exchange upon which Secretary of War had signed were at issue; the court held that the U.S. was not liable upon these instruments, stating:

"We have no officers in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority, And while some of these, as the President, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law," 7 Wall., at 677-678.

"Our statute books are filled with Acts authorizing the making of contracts with the government through its various officers and departments but, in every instance, the person entering into such a contract must look to the statute under which it is made, and see for himself that his contract comes within the terms of the law", 7 Wall., at 680.

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240 (1882): Arlington, Lee's estate, subject of litigation, the United States claiming ownership via tax sale some years earlier. In holding for Lee's heirs, the Court stated:

"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supremem power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives", 106 U.S., at 220.

"Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights", 106 U.S., at 220,221.

Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 387 (1917): Power company built structures upon federal lands and claimed right through prior approval of government agents; held:
"Of this it is enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit", 243 U.S., at 409.

Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 49 S. Ct. 129 (1929): The mills and subordinate revenue agent entered into informal compromise agreement regarding tax liability, the validity of which was at issue here. That agreement was held invalid:
"We think that Congress intended by the staute to prescribe the exclusive method by which tax cases could be compromised, requiring therefor the concurrence of the Commissioner, and the Secretary, and prescribing the formality with which, as a matter of public concern, it should be attested in the files of the Commissioner's office; and did not intend to intrust the final settlement of such matters to the informal action of subordinate officials of the Bureau. When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode", 278 U.S., at 288,289.

"It is plain that no compromise is authorized by this statute which is not assent to by the Secretary of the Treasury... For this reason, if for no other, the informal agreement made in this case did not constitute a settlement which in itself was binding upon the Government or the Mills", 278 U.S., at 289.

See also Brubaker v. United States, 342 F. 2d 655 (7th Cir., 1965).

Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931): Battle over advertising of "obesity cure".
"Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necesary applications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress. They cannot be merely asumed by administrative offices; nor can they be created by the courts in the proper exercise of their judicial functions", 283 U.S., at 649.

State ex rel McConnell v. First State Bank, 22 Tenn. App. 577, 124 S.W. 2d 726, 733 (1938): Bank insolvency case:
"All persons dealing with public officers are bound to take notice of the law prescribing their authority and powers".

Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 113 F. 2d 284 (5th Cir., 1940):
"Public officers are merely the agents of the public, whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind the principal, and all persons dealing with such agents are charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority", 113 F. 2d, at 286.

Department of Ins. of Indiana v. Church Members Relief Ass'n., 217 Ind. 58, 26 N.E. 2d 51 (1940):
"When the right to do a thing depends upon legislative authority, and the Legislature has failed to authorize it, or has forbidden it, no amount of acquiescence, or consent, or approval of the doing of it by a ministerial officer, can create a right to do the thing which is unauthorized or forbidden", 26 N.E. 2d, at 52.

United States v. Hawthorne, 31 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Tex., 1940):

"A regulation dies with the statute from which it gains its life".

Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 61 S.Ct.995 (1941): A bond was given for taxes, the collector released that bond, but government sued on the bond. Held:
"Power to release or otherwise dispose of the rights and property of the United States is lodged in the Congress by the Constitution. Art. IV, [section] 3, Cl. 2. Subordinate officers of the United States are without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them by Act of Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted. [cites omitted]. Collectors of internal revenue are subordinate officers charged with the ministerial duty of collecting taxes... There is no statute in terms authorizing them to remit taxes, to pass upon the claims for abatement of taxes or to release any obligation for their payment. Only the Commissioner, with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized to compromise a tax deficiency for a sum less than the amount lawfully due...".

"There is thus no basis in the statutes of the United States for implying an authority in a collector to release a bond for the payment of a tax which the Commissioner alone is permitted to reduce by way of compromise when the Secretary of the Treasury consents", 313 U.S., at 294, 295.

Quaker Oats Co. v. Fed. Security Administrator, 129 F. 2d 76, 80 (7th Cir., 1942), reversed on other grounds at 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 589 (1943):
"We assume there could be no dissent from the proposition that an administrative agency has only such authority in the administration of a Congressional enactment as is expressly conferred, or as may be reasonably implied".

Youngblood v United States, 141 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir., 1944): Action to compel recorder to record tax liens.
"[T]he authority of ministerial officers is to be strictly construed as including only such powers as are expressly conferrred, or necessarily implied", 141 F. 2d, at 913.

See also United States v. Watashe, 102 F. 2d 428, 431 (10th Cir., 1939).
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559 (1944): Milk price control act administered by Ag. Sec. was subject to challenge:
"When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted... The responsibility of determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in such instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts", 321 U.S., at 309, 310.

See also Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F. 2d 600, 605 (10th Cir., 1968).

Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1 (1947):
"Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority", 332 U.S. at 384.

United States v. Jones, 176 F. 2d 278 (9th Cir., 1949): U.S. brought action to set aside sale of surplus WWII items, but Jones prevailed in both the District Court and on appeal. The court held:
"This means that a public officer, in exercising powers conferred upon him by statute and regulation, is bound to follow the mode or manner prescribed. One who deals with such official is on his notice of possible limitations of authority. And no estoppel can arise against the Government from the performance of unauthorized acts or from authority exercised in a manner forbidden", 176 F. 2d, at 281.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952): Truman's takeover of the steel mills held unconstitutional.

Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College of Mining and Technology, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W. 2d 681 (1952):
"'The extent of the authority of the people's public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.'

"'Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law...'

"'The powers of State officers being fixed by law, all persons dealing with such officers are charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority", 53 N.W. 2d, at.

Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955): A doctor was cleared twice of loyalty charges, but the Board on its own reconsidered those charges and debarred him from federal service for such; in reversing, the Court held:

"Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must of course be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that authority", 349 U.S., at 345.

Phillips v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 238 F. @d 234 (9th Cir., 1956):
"Here the jurisdiction of the old commission over the subject matter had expired by abolition of the agency. The delegated power to the Executive Director of the old commission expired when it went out of existence. The rulings may be explained upon principals of the agency as well as upon grounds of lack of jurisdiction. If the new commission desired to delegate power to the Executive Director, it could not act before its creation and assumption of authority. His purported action in the interim between the expiration of his delegation of power by the old commission and the organization of the new commission was void, not voidable, because no body had jurisdiction of the subject matter at the time and he had no delegated authority to act in the premises. The fact that the acts abolishing one body and creating another were passed simultaneously is without significance", 238 F. 2d, at 235.

But, see contra authority at Pentheny, Ltd. v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 360 F. 2d 786, 790 (3rd Cir., 1966): repeal and re-enactment considered as a substitution.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F.2d 818 (3rd Cir., 1957): Defendant and endorser gave note to government as result of loan, and upon suit, District Attorney extended terms, for which endorser argued that he had been released. Court held act of DA void as lacking authority:
"It is well settled that no consideration of public policy can properly induce a court to reject the statutory definition of the powers of an officer, and that anyone dealing with such officer is required to take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law upon him", 244 F. 2d, at 820, 821.

Board of Comm. of Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund v. Clay, 214 Ga. 70, 102 S.E. 2d 575 (1958):
"The powers of all public officers are defined by law... Where the law creates an office, one holding such office has no authority to perform any act not legitimately within the scope of such authority", 102 S.E. 2d, at 577.

Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P. 2d 941 (Colo., 1960):
"It follows that a collateral attack may be made here for 'acts or orders [of administrative officers or agencies] which do not come clearly within the powers granted or which fall beyond the purview of the statute granting the agency or body its powers [such orders] are not merely erroneous, but are void'...'They [officers or agencies] are without power to act contrary to the provisions of the law or the clear legislative intendment, or to exceed the authority conferred on them by statute", 355 P. 2d, at 943.

Ledgering v. State of Washington, 385 P. 2d 522 (Wash., 1963); Driver's license revocation case.
"We do not believe, however, that when the legislature vested in the director discretionary power to suspend...it, absent express declaration, intended the power of executive decision in this area be delegated by the director to assistants, or relegated to a simple mechanical process."

"Gathering, collating, and presenting such facts as may be required by the director, together with making appropriate recommendations, preparing, signing, and mailing notices and orders in the name of the director are without doubt delegable duties. But, the basic responsibility and authority of exercising the discretion and power of decision...rests exclusively with the director", 385 P. 2d, at 526.

Independent School District #639, Vesta v. Independent School District #893, Echo, 160 N.W. 2d 686 (Minn., 1968):
"To allow one to take official action simply by giving oral approval to a letter which does not recite the action and which does not go out under one's name is to extend permissible delegation beyond reasonable bounds", 160 N.W. 2d, at 689.

Country Gas Service, Inc. v. United States, 405 F. 2d 147 (1st Cir., 1969): Taxpayers entered into compromise with revenue agent to settle tax liability in beneficial manner. In holding the agent's agreement void, the court stated:

"The narrow issue presented by this case is whether the revenue agent had authority to make a binding agreement... The exclusive procedure for compromising tax liabilities is set forth in Int. Rev. Code of 1954 [section] 7122. This section explicitly reposes such authority in 'the Secretary or his delegate' and such delegation stops at the district level. Since the exclusive means of compromise established by [section] 7122 was not utilized in this case, any arrangement taxpayer made with agent McInnis had no legal standing", 405 F. 2d, at 149, 150.

Court cited delegation orders in this case.

See also Brooks v. United States, 833 F. 2d 1136, 1145 (4th Cir., 1987), and excellent list of cases cited therein.

California School Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Comm. of P.V.U.S.D., 89 Cal. Rptr. 620, 474 P. 2d 436 (1970);

"As a general rule, powers conferred upon public agencies and officers which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion are in the nature of public trusts and cannot be surrendered or delegated to subordinates in the absence of statutory authorization [cites omitted]. Under normal circumstances and absent statutory provisions to the contrary the dismissal of employees involves the exercise of judgment or discretion."

"On the other hand, public agencies may delegate the performance of misterial tasks, including the investigation and determination of facts preliminary to agency action [cites omitted]. Moreover, an agency's approval or ratification of an act delegated to a subordinate validates the act, which becomes the act, which becomes the act of the agency itself", 474 P. 2d, at 439.

Tulsa Exposition and Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 468 P. 2d 501 (Ok., 1970):
"Counties have only such authority as is granted by statute [cites omitted]. The Board of County Commissioners in exercising corporate powers is limited to those fields expressly assigned to such subdivisions of the state by the legislature [cites omitted]. Public officers possess only such authority as is conferred upon them by law and such authority must be exercised in the manner provided by law", 468 P. 2d, at 508.

See also Brown v. State Election Board, 369 P. 2d 140 (Ok.,1962).

Baker v. Deschutes County, 498 P. 2d 803 (Or. App., 1972): Contract to sell county land held void:
"It is fundamental law that government entities and their officers must find sanction for their actions in the statute itself. There is no apparent authority in a public officer whose duties are prescribed by law as there would be in the case of an agent for a private party [cites omitted].

"Persons contracting with a public officer acting under a public law must, at their peril, ascertain the scope of the officer's authority [cites omitted] and are chargeable with notice of the contents of the enactment conferring that authority. A contract by a public officer in excess of the provisions of the statute authorizing such contract is void, so far as it departs from or exceeds the terms of the law under which it was attempted to be negotiated', 498 P. 2d, at 805.

Soriano v. United States, 494 F. 2d 681 (9th Cir., 1974);
"[A]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, having only those powers expressly granted to it by Congress or included by necessary implication from the Congressional grant", 494 F. 2d, at 683.

Steele v. Gray, 64 Wis. 2d 422, 219 N.W. 2d 312 (1974): Question regarding delegation of authority to revoke "good time" credits of prisoners:
"[A]n officer in whom discretionary power is vested cannot delegate that power without statutory authority to do so', N.W. 2d, at 316.

United States v. Gemmill, 535 F. 2d 1145 (9th Cir., 1976): Indians convicted of trespass had convictions reversed due to lack of delegated authority of Forest Service officials to close part of national forest:
"Absent an explicit delegation from the Secretary, the boundaries of the Forest Supervisor's authority shouldnot be extended into areas the regulations have clearly reserved for higher officials.

"By immediately closing the entire area, the Supervisor went beyond the limits of his authority and exercised a power that had not been granted to him. The closure orders were invalid and the trespass convictions cannot stand", 535 F. 2d, at 1152.

Court referenced organizational structure and delegation orders published in the CFR.

Lopez-Telles v. I.N.S., 564 F. 2d 1302 (9th Cir., 1977): Deportee alleged that administrative law judge could refuse to deport for humanitarian reasons. In rejecting this argument, it was stated:
"Immigration judges, or special inquiry officers, are creatures of statute, receiving some of their powers and duties directly from Congress...and some of them by subdelegation from the Attorney General... The statutes and the regulations implementing them... contain a detailed and elaborate description of the authority of immigration judges. Nowhere is there any mention of the power of an immigration judge to award the type of discretionary relief that was sought here", 564 F. 2d, at 1303.

Churchill v. S.A.D. No. 49 Teacher's Ass'n., 380 A. 2d 186 (Me., 1977):
"[P]ublic bodies or officers may exercise only that power which is conferred upon them by law. The source of that authority must be found in the enabling statute either expressly or by necessary inference as an incidence essential to the full exercise of the powers specifically granted", 380 A. 2d, at 192.

Champaign County, Illinois v. United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 611 F. 2d 1200 (7th Cir., 1979):
"A delegation of authority survives the resignation of the person who issued the delegation", 611 F. 2d, at 1207.

See also Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F. 2d 1332, 1343 (D.C. Cir., 1983): Delegations are not affected by change in personnel but continue until revoked; cites several cases; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 (D. Minn., 1962); and In re Subpoena of Persico, 522 F. 2d 41, 62 (2nd Cir.,1975).

Hoppe v. King County, 95 Wash. 2d 332, 622 P. 2d 845 (1980):
"Public officers have only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute", 622 P. 2d, at 848.

Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F. 2d 1378 (9th Cir., 1981): Retirement benefits case. Court stated:
"Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation", 644 F. 2d, at 1383.

Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, 650 F 2d 1093 (9th Cir., 1981): Employment contract action involving charge of age discrimination. Court held:
"All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge of the Statutes-at-Large....[I]t is well established that anyone who deals with the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority", 650 F. 2d, at 1100.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Olsen, 338 N.W. 2d 97 (N.D., 1983): Union action to compel state to pay wage increase via union agreement:
"It is well settled that public officials have only such authority as is expressly given them by the constitution and statutes together with those powers and duties which are necessarily implied from the express grant of authority", 338 N.W. 2d, at 100.

In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 762 (N.D. Cal., 1983):
"[A]n unlawful or unauthorized exercise of power does not become legitimated or authorized by reason of habitude."

See also Umpleby, by and through Umpleby v. State, 347 N.W. 2d 156, 161 (N.D., 1984).

Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F. 2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. Cir., 1984):
"[W]hen an officer acts wholly outside the scope of the powers granted to him by statute or constitutional provision, the official's actions have been considered to be unauthorized."

Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. Ill., 1985):
"Acting without statutory power at all, or misapplying one's statutory power, will result in a finding that such action was ultra vires."

(On appeal: 773 F. 2d 883 (7th Cir., 1985), and 107 S.Ct. 638.

Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F 2d 209 (D.C.Cir., 1987): Oral compromise held invalid as contrary to regulations. Court relied upon delegation orders.

United States v. Providence Journal Company, ??? U.S. ???__, 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988): District judge appointed a private attorney to pursue contempt charge against a party in judge's court. On appeal, contempt vacated, and attorney pursued writ, which was granted, In vacating writ, Supremes held that only the Solicitor General had authority to apply for writ on behalf of the United States, a power not possessed by the attorney.

United States v. Plesinski, 912 F. 2d 1033 (9th Cir., 1990); State Attorney General appointed special U.S. prosecutor. His authority was upheld.
Cases concerning proposition that agencies must act within their statutory authority:

(a) Regents of University Sysytem of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 598, 70 S.Ct. 370 (1950): "As an administrative body, the Commission must find its powers within the compass of the authority given it by Congress";

(b) F.T.C. v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428, 77 S.Ct. 502 (1957): "the Commission may exercise only the powers granted it by the Act",

(c) Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322, S.Ct. 1611 (1961): "the fact is that the Board is entirely a creature of Congress and the determinative question is not what the Board thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do".

Excellent summary of law and principles regarding delegations: Shreveport Engraving Co. v. United States, 143 F. 2d 222 (5th Cir.1944), and Krug v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 245 F. 2d 848 (5th Cir., 1957).

Authority of public officials limited by statute:

City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Comm., 8 Cal. App. 2d 580, 47 P. 2d 1096 (1935);

Davis v. Pelley, 230 Ind. 248, 102 N.E. 2d 910 (1952);

Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hackett, 312 Ky. 288, 227 S.W. 2d 199 (1950);

J.S. Bradley Co. v. Squire, 65 Ohio App. 186 29 N.E. 2d 430 (1939);

Probasco v. Sikes, 77 Wyo. 108 307 P. 2d 817, 821 (1957).

Crosthwait v. State, 135 Texas 119, 138 S.W. 2d 1060, 1061 (1940).

Thornton v. United States, 73-1 USTC 9232 (E.D. Pa., 1973): no delegated authority to make jeopardy.

The American public should know the functions and delegated authority of federal agencies because it [the American public] is charged with the knowledge of the scope and limitations upon the authority of federal agents, who can only act within the scope of such authority; see Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3 (1947: Dade Park Jockey Club v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 314, 69 S.W. 2d 363, 365 (1934): Morris Plan Bank of Georgia v. Simmons, 201 Ga. 157, 39 S.E. 2d 166, 175 (1946); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 837, 860 (D. Minn., 1946); Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Or. 305, 193 P. 2d 543, 552 (1948); United States v. Jones, 176 F. 2d 278, 281 (9th Cir., 1949); Patten v. State Personnel Board, 234 P. 2d 987, 990 (Cal. App., 1951); State ex rel Young v. Niblack, 99 N.E. 2d 839, 841 ( Ind., 1951); State v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 138 Conn. 334, 84 A. 2d 579, 581 (1951); Davis v. Pelley, 102 N.E. 2d 910, 912 (Ind., 1952); Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 54 N.W. 2d 472, 476 (S.D., 1952); Sittler v. Board of Control of Michigan College, 333 Mich. 681, 53 N.W. 2d 681, 684 (1952); Bear River Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Placer County, 258 P. 2d 543, 546 (Cal. App., 1953); Rogers v. County Comm. of New Haven County, 141 Conn. 426, 106 A. 2d 757 (1954); Mason County Civic Research Council v. County of Mason, 343 Mich. 313, 72 N.W. 2d 292, 296 (1955); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gordon, 244 F. 2d 818, 821 (3rd Cir., 1957); Joseph A. Cicci, Inc. v. Allanson, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 911, 913 (1959); Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E. 2d 239, 242 (1959); Flavell v. Dept. of Welfare, City and County of Denver, 355 P. 2d 941, 943 (Colo., 1960); City of Calhoun v. Holland, 222 Ga. 817, 152 S.W. 2d 752, 754 (1966); Gray v. Johnson, 395 F. 2d 533, 537 (10th Cir., 1968): Gammill v. Shackelford, 480 P. 2d 920 922 (Okl., 1970); Baker v. Deschutes County, 498 P. 2d 803, 805 (Or. App., 1972); City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 513 P. 2d 80, 83 (1973); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F. 2d 1145 (9th Cir., 1976); Lopez -Telles v. I.N.S., 564 F. 2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F. 2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir., 1981); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F. 2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir., 1981); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F. 2d 427 432 (8th Cir., 1984); and Watrel v. Commonwealth Dept. of Education, 488 A. 2d 378, 381 (Pa. Comwlth., 1985). And acts of federal agents without delegated authority are void; see Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S.Ct. 651 (1942); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820 (1974); United States v. Pees, 645 F. Supp. 687 (D. Col., 1986); United States v. Hovey, 674 F. Supp. 161 (D. Del., 1987); United States v. Spain, 825 F. 2d 1426 (10th Cir., 1987); United States v. Emerson, 846 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir., 1988); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F. 2d 283 (9th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Widdowson, 916 F. 2d 587, 589 (10th Cir., 1990). If a federal agent exceeds his delegated authority and commits a tort within a state, he may be sued in state court; see Johnson v. Earle, 245 F. 2d 793 (9th Cir., 1957); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F. 2d 29 (5th Cir., 1974); and Rutherford v. United States, 702 F. 2d 580 (5th Cir., 1983).

(a) In United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 658 (1916), the Court had before it the validity of this act which operated within the jurisdiction of the state, and it held that dismaissal of the indictment was mandated because the act invaded the jurisdiction of the state and Congress simply lacked the constitutional power to penalize mere possession of opium within state jurisdiction.

(b) In United States v. Ah Hung, 243 F. 762, 764 (E.D.N.Y., 1917), it was stated: "Mere possession of an article injurious to health would not render a person liable to a United States statute unless some constitutional basis for the statute gives the United States the right to regulate upon the subject."

(c) In Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 48 S.Ct. 388 (1928), defendant was prosecuted, and in discussing the issue, court stated:
"In interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress, and must be regarded as invalid", Id., at 341.
(d) In United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 74 S.CT. 190 (1953), seizure of devices without any proof of interstate transport held invalid.

(e) United States v. Contrades, 196 F. Supp. 803, 811 (D. Hawaii, 19??): The drug laws "have been bottomed on the taxing powers of Congress or on the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce."

neodemes said...

Gosh, moogie, all that legal research must have taken you hours...

Or did it?

mogel said...

Nemo: I'm sure you did a google search & put in "delegated authority" & a few lines down, you found the link.

After all, you are the "google king", no argument there.